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What's Become of Derivations? Defaults and Invocations• 
Arnold M Zwicki 
The enormous success of transformational syntax hinged on the powerful~ as it1ttitned 
out, only too powerful - logic provided by its scheme of derivations '(sequences of syntactic 
representations leading from 'underlying' or '\leep' structures to 'surface' structures),. with an 
attendant scheme of sequential rule application and stipulated 'rule ordering'. The challenge 
to monostratal syntactic frameworks is to get the effect of transformations entirely'via static 
conditions on syntactic representations, a program that entails devising alternative logics 
capable of expressing the attested types of interactions between c~nditfons ori S:yntactic"form. 
These interactions are of three types, the unproblematic one of mutual applicability and 
two others that are the focus of this paper: preclusion, for which the crucial concept is 
defaulting. and superimposition, for which the crucial concept is invocation. Preclusion 
corresponds roughly to 'bleeding' interaction, superimposition to 'feeding' interaction, but I 
will avoid these terms from phonology because they are embedded in an ineradicably 
derivational framework.1 
I. Morphological background. I will illustrate the analytic points first from 
morphology rather than syntax. 
I assume that conditions on representations (whether morphological or syntactic) are 
imposed by rules. each rule being an association between a set of formal conditions and a 
semantic function (and possibly also pragmatic values); in syntax, then, !l!.!e. is an effective 
synonym of construction, as this latter term is used in Zwicky (1987, 1988, 1989a) and Fillmore 
et al. (1988). There are also 'listed' form-meaning pairings (idiosyncratic lexemes in the case 
of morphology, as well as idiosyncratic syntactic patterns, also known as ~. rules 
differing from listed items in that both the formal conditions and the semantic functions in 
rules are general. 
I.I. Qeuu!n. Defaults play a role in morphology whenever there is competition 
between conditions, either by virtue of their associated meanings (in word formation) or by 
virtue of their associated phonological shapes (in inflection) or by the two types of 
competition in concert (in both word formation and inflection). 
I.I.I. Dual competition. English derivational morphology has a number of rules 
licensing abstract Ns built on Adj stems: GOODNESS with suffix -ness, SANITY with suffix 
-ity, CONSTANCY with suffix -(c)y, for instance. The default (general, predominant, and 
productive) rule is the one with -ness, which is overridden by various other rules for certain 
lexemes. English inflectional morphology has at least two rules realizing the grammatical 
category (hereafter, gramcat) PSP (past participle) for Vs, one setting the form identical to the 
PST (past), as in jumped and thought, the other using the suffix /n/, as in taken and thrown. The 
default (general, predominant, and productive) rule is the former one, which is overridden by 
the latter for certain lexemes. In these examples it happens that the formal conditions in the 
rules are incompatible, so that there is dual competition, in phonology as well as as meaning. 
It is impossible to suffix both -ness and -ity directly to a stem, for instance. 
In inflectional morphology it is not uncommon for one rule to realize a superset (say, 
2 SG INDIC or I PL INDIC, to choose an example from Hua (Haiman 1980)) of the gramcats 
realized by another rule (say, INDIC in general, covering the other two SG forms, the other 
two PL forms, and all three DU forms). When the phonological effects of the two rules are 
incompatible (as in Hua, where these are suffixes -ne and -e, respectively, filling the same slot), 
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then of course the more specific rule takes precedence, via the general metaprinciple I will 
refer to as Panini's Principle. 
There is also a general metaprinciple of 'lexical blocking', according to which the 
existence of a stipulated association of meaning and form for a particular lexeme (as in the 
PST went for GO) precludes associations provided via rules. 
1.1.2. Meaning competition alone. Phonologically compatible rules - word formation 
rules - can be in competition, however, as when prefixal and suffixal causatives are available 
in the same language (ENLARGE and CHRISTIANIZE, for instance), or when 'zero 
derivation' and affixation serve as alternatives (CAGE and ENCAGE, or BONE and DEBONE, 
for instance). 
1.1.3. Phonological competition alone. There are also situations where rules · 
inflectional rules - that are perfectly compatible semantically are incompatible phonologically. 
I have in mind here the 'slot competition' examples that Stephen Anderson has unearthed. As 
Anderson (I 986: 8) says of Georgian, 'the formal markers Y.· [marking first-person subject] and 
g- [marking second-person object] are mutually exclusive by virtue of their "competition" for 
the same formal position'; the y- prefix is the winner here. 
1.1.4. Parochiality. Note that some of these override-default relationships involve 
specific rules, but that others· in particular, lexical blocking and Panini's Principle· involve 
general principles. It is not always clear whether a particular example is of one type or the 
other. If subregularities in conjugation are analyzed via features, for instance, so that a 
lexeme like TAKE or THROW is [CONJ 2] while regular Vs lack this feature, then the 
precedence of the subregular form over the regular one follows from Panini's Principle, though 
one might instead want to say that the relationship is to be stated directly as one holding 
between the two rules. It might also turn out that some general principle would predict the 
winning rule in the Georgian competition (perhaps by reference to the gramcats involved), 
though I am not sanguine about the possibility. 
What is important here is not in fact whether particular relationships follow from a 
general principle or require parochial stipulation, but that the relationships hold between 
rules, not representations. 
1.2. Invocation. The leading idea here is that satisfying the conditions placed by one 
rule requires checking the conditions in a number of other rules. 
1.2.1. Invocation by mention. The fundamental way in which invocation plays a role 
in morphology is, like Panini's Principle, so obvious that it is easy to overlook: Mentioning 
conditions on the 'inputs' to a rule calls up all the rules and lists that make those conditions 
satisfiable. 
A derivational rule applying to ADJ inputs (for instance, the nominalization rule for 
OAFISHNESS, SWEATINESS, SPEECHLESSNESS, and HAPPINESS) calls up, or invokes, all 
the conditions relevant for ADJ lexemes (including both the rules for OAFISH, SWEATY, and 
SPEECHLESS and the listing of items like HAPPY). To pursue the goal of determining 
whether an abstract N like OAFISHNESS is licensed by the derivational rules of English, we 
must determine, as a subgoal, that OAFISH is licensed as an ADJ. 
1.2.2. Calls on rule sets. In addition to input conditions, morphological rules place 
conditions on the phonology of input-output associations. A rule might stipulate that the 
phonology of the output is the phonology of the input plus a stipulated suffix, for instance. 
These association conditions can involve reference to sets of morphological rules, as well as 
to operations on phonological shapes; see Zwicky 1989b for further discussion and references. 
Here I cite three types of examples. 
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I.2.2.1. Word formation caHing on inflectjon. There can be word formation ..rules that 
call for specific inflected forms of an input lexeme, as when a French rule deriving manner 
ADVs in ·ment (like FAUSSEMENT 'falsely') builds on the FEM form of an ADJ (like fausse, 
the FEM form of FAUX 'false'), whatever that happens to be. 
I.2.2.2. Rules of referraI. There can be inflectional rules that explicitly refer the 
realization of some set of features to the realization for another, as when the default rule for 
the English PSP stipulates that the PSP for a lexeme has the same realization as the .PST for 
that lexeme, whatever the latter happens .to be. 
1.2.2.3. Calls on stems Both inflectional and word formation rules can refer to specific 
stems, as in McCarthy's (1981) treatment of the 'patterns' or 'binyanim' in the derivational 
morphology of Arabic, each pattern involving a combination of a CV melody with a vocalism 
and a root consonantism. When a derivational rule stipulates that it uses a particular pattern, 
the rule or rules describing the conditions on phonological shape for that pattern will be 
invoked. 
2. Some observations. Before extending this discussion from morp1J.ology into syntax, 
I pause to make four metatheoretical observations. 
2.1. Theorizing. My intention in section I was not to advance a new theory of 
morphology, nor will I be advancing a new theory of syntax in sections 3 and 5. My discussion 
is at a different level of abstraction from theorizing proper, since it aims at deHneating the 
properties-of expressions, the characteristics of rules, and the relations between rules that an 
adequate theory must be able to express in its formalism. I take no stand here on the nature 
of such a formalism. 
· 2.2. Directionality. The temporal metaphors I have used for defaults and invocations 
run the opposite way from the ones that are converted to theoretical status in processual 
derivations. An override 'takes precedence' over a default, but a (more) basic representation 
(the analogue of the default) 'comes before' the derived representation it is mapped into. An 
invoking· rule 'calls up' an invoked condition· and so can be said to 'come first', but in 
processual derivations the latter describes a representation that 'precedes' the one to which 
the former applies; crudely, invocations work top-down, while processual derivations work 
bottom-up. 
The temporal metaphors for defaults and invocations are dispensible, however. This is 
straightforward for defaults, but might not be so clear for invocations, especially given my 
own inclination to think of rules as applying as in top-down parsing • as checking, for 
instance, that an expression satisfies the conditions of a particular derivational rule of Eriglish 
-by determining that the expression is an abstract N and that it can be analyzed as X plus 0 ness, 
then checking that X is an ADJ (perhaps by virtue of satisfying the conditions on a 
derivational rule with ADJ outputs). But this way of thinking of things is a personal bias, and 
others undoubtedly will find it more intuitive to think of expressions as being built up from 
elementary expressions, with the conditions invoked in some rule checked 'first' to see if X 
is an eligible subpart for the purposes of that rule. As with ordinary phrase structure rules, 
neither way of thinking is somehow right. Rules can be conceptualized statically, as just 
stipulating a set of conditions that have to be satisfied within the expressions of a language. 
2.3. Descriptive power. It might seem that successive invocations of rules and 
successive overrides of defaults are just derivations run backwards, and (from the 
metatheoretical point of view) no real improvement over transformations. However, as I 
pointed out in Zwicky (1986b), a framework built on defaults is less powerful than one built 
on derivations, in the sense that a default/override analysis can always be translated into a 
basic/derived analysis while the reverse translation is not always possible without gross loss 
of generalization. · 
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Indeed, since a derivational framework describes relations between (sets of) 
representations, it makes available any number of strata of representations at which conditions 
might be stated. In a purely static framework, where invocations and overrides are relations 
between rules, there is only one stratum of representations at which conditions can be stated. 
This is the source of the greater descriptive power of derivational frameworks. If we can do 
without this power in morphology (and syntax), that is all to the good. The issue is certainly 
a controversial one - the relational grammarians, in particular, have maintained that there are 
syntactic generalizations referring to several such strata (Perlmutter 1982) - but I will pursue 
a nonderivational framework, following the monostratal program of generalized phrase 
structure grammar (GPSG) (Gazdar et al. 198S). 
Note that I have argued, in Zwicky (1986b), that phonological rule interactions, whether 
these involve two rules of automatic phonology or two morphonological rules, do indeed 
require the more powerful logic made available by derivations, while it appears that rule 
interactions in morphology and syntax do not. Monostra tality seems to be characteristic of 
morphosyntax but not of phonology. 
2.4: Representations. What should a (morphological or syntactic) representation for 
some expression contain? Certainly, the information about this expression's properties that 
is immediately relevant for determining whether (morphological or syntactic) rules are 
applicable, plus the information that is needed for the purposes of semantic interpretation, of 
assigning pragmatic values, and of phonology. 
If morphological and syntactic rules are viewed, as they are here, as associations of 
formal conditions with a semantic interpretation function and pragmatic values, then the 
question boils down to a matter of the information immediately relevant for the applicability 
of these rules, plus the information relevant to phonology, both for the applicability of 
morphonological rules and for 'prosodic domain formation', which associates the (prosodic) 
domains of automatic phonology with morphosyntactic representations. I suggest in Zwicky 
(I 989c) that considerable insight into morphosyntactic representations might be gotten by 
considering the needs of phonology. Be that as it may, it is none too clear just which 
properties of expressions are in fact immediately relevant for the applicability of 
morphological or syntactic rules. 
Presumably, when an expression satisfies some overriding rule, like the /n/ PSP rule, 
then information about the corresponding default(s), here the referral of PSP to PST, is never 
relevant. What counts is what actually appears, not what might have appeared instead. 
Matters are a bit more complex for invocations. The conditions placed by a rule on 
expressions can be seen as coming in layers. For instance, an inflectional rule realizing PSP 
on Vs requires (as a necessary condition) that an expression belong to the category V and (as 
a sufficient condition) that it belong to the gramcat PSP; these are primary, or layer-I, 
conditions. A referral of PSP to PST is in layer 2, and a realization of PST via suffixation of 
/d/ in layer 3.2 Now consider the word formation rule illustrated in the compounds 
worm-eaten, termite-infested, and doctor-approved. It requires (as a necessary condition) that 
an expression belong to the category ADJ and (as a sufficient condition) that it be composed 
of two expressions, one of category N and one of category V; these are layer-I conditions. The 
requirement that the V belong to the gramcat PSP is in layer 2, a referral of PSP to PST in 
layer 3, and /d/-suffixation (as in approved) in layer 4. 
But, given an expression E, just how many layers of conditions that E satisfies are 
relevant to E's own ability to participate in constructions? I do not believe this question has 
a simple answer, either 'the first n layers' for some fixed n, or for that matter 'all of them'. 
I do reject the idea that we should assemble into a single representation all the information 
about which conditions on which rules E satisfies, no matter what the layer of these 
conditions - an idea embodied to some extent in the 'analysis trees' of Montague grammar 
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(Dowty et al. 1981: ch. 7), though these are not intended as syntactic representations, and 
embodied fully in the relational networks of relational grammar and in the R-graphs of 
arc-pair grammar (Johnson & Postal 1980, Postal 1982), which are so intended. That is, a 
representation of E is an assemblage of information relevant for the application of 
grammatical rules to E, not a full trace of the procedures involved in determining E's 
wellformedness according to those rules. 
3. Defaults in syntax. Defaults have played an explicit. role in. the various 
'unification-based' frameworks (Shieber 1986) for syntax, including GPSG and 
lexical-functional grammar (LFG) (Bresnan & Kaplan 1982). The true role for defaults is 
rather larger than syntacticians have thought. To begin with, many of the basic/derived 
relationships between representations in transformational syntax (relationships expressed as 
a single transformation) translate into override/default relationships between two rules in a 
monostratal framework (Zwicky (to appear)). 
As in morphology, in syntax override/default relationships arise generally whenever 
there is competition between rules expressing compatible meanings via incompatible formal 
characteristics - having to do with branching into constituents, with the placement of 
properties on words within a construct (including government of or agreement in gramcats), 
or with the ordering of the immediate constituents. 
3.1. Dual competition. There are situations where distinct, and formally incompatible, 
rules express the very same meanings, so that there is competition in meaning as well as form. 
For instance, the hierarchical (binary) subject-predicate (SVP) construction in English, 
as in I sing badly and For me to sing badly (would be no surprise), serves as the default vis-a-vis 
the flat (ternary) subject-auxiliary inversion (SAi) construction, as in Must I sing?. The two 
constructions have the same semantics, involving the application of a function (associated with 
the VP) to an argument (associated with the subject (SU)). And they are certainly formally 
incompatible; the SU cannot both precede (as in SVP) and follow (as in SAi) the head V of the 
clause. That SAi is the special, overriding, construction is indicated by its use in a small but 
diverse collection of constructions: two interrogative constructions, the yes-no question (YNQ), 
as in Must I sing?, and the information question (WHQ), as in Which songs must I sing?; focused 
negation (FOCNEG), as in Not a song did I sing; and two conjunctionless conditional 
constructions, one counterfactual, as in Were I in better voice, (I would sing) and Had I known 
your wishes, (I would have sung), and one not, as in Should you want to sing, (we can supply an 
accompanist). 
3.2.' Panini's Principle again. A somewhat different sort of situation arises in the 
matching of morphological cases' to grammatical relations (grels), .There are default matchings 
(NOM to SUs, ACC to DOs, DAT to I Os), which are overridden in many languages by the 
assignment of 'quirky' cases; in Icelandic (Andrews 1982), for instance, these are ACC, DAT, 
or GEN for a SU and DAT, GEN, or NOM for a DO: 
I assume that for each configuration of quirky case assignment there is a special rule -
so that Icelandic has, in addition to a (general) rule, call it #28, stipulating that head.Vs are 
compatible with SUs (not otherwise constrained) and DOs (not otherwise constrained), a 
(special) rule, call it #97, stipulating that head Vs are compatible with DAT SUs and NOM 
DOs, another (special) rule, call it #35, stipulating that head Vs are compatible with SUs (not 
otherwise constrained) and DAT DOs, and so on. Every rule R mentioning a lexical category 
C induces a subcategorization of C, the relevant subcategory Cf comprising all the members 
of C eligible to occur in the mentioned slot in R; thus, for Ice andic there is a subcategory 
V28 of garden-variety. transitive verbs, a subcategory V 97 of DAT-SU transitives, a subcategory 
V35 of DAT-DO transitives, and so on. In any event, rules #97 and #3S arc semantically in 
competition with #28 (the semantics for #97 and #35 includes, though not necessarily properly, 
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the semantics for #28), and they are formally more specific than it, both in their argument 
cases and in their head subcategories, so that Panini's Principle says that they override it. 
This treatment presupposes the splitting of 'standard' (nonquirky) case assignment into 
two parts: rules like #28 in Icelandic, which describe compatibility between a head and 
constructs bearing specific grels to this head, but mention no case properties of these 
constructs; and other principles, analogous to the Feature Specification Defaults of GPSG, 
which describe default implicational relationships between properties of constructs, in this 
instance between a grel (like SU) and a case (like NOM). Principles of the second sort can 
be seen as compatibility ru1es of a degenerate sort, which merely license certain properties as 
admissible on a construct X bearing a particular grel, without regard for what other constructs 
X might be compatible with. 
Just as there is quirky case, there is quirky agreement, as in the varieties of Somali 
where a rule permitting verbs to be FEM SG with PL SUs from a particular declension class 
overrides the default scheme of agreement via compatibility in gramcats (Zwicky & Pullum 
1983). In quirky agreement, certain agreement triggers require specific nonagreeing properties 
on their targets. Panini's Principle says that such rules should override rules calling for 
gramcat compatibility between agreement triggers in general and their targets.4 
3.3. Formal competition alone. As in morphology (section 1.1.3 above), two syntactic 
rules can compete solely by virtue of their formal conditions. 
Consider, for example, the English WHQ and FOCNEG constructions, both of which 
involve a 'focus initial' (FOCINIT) construction, which focuses on a proform (an indefinite 
WH lexeme like WHICH or WHEN, a negative lexeme like NOT or NEVER, respectively) by 
requiring clause-initial position for a construct containing the proform, as in Which cookies 
have you eaten? and Not a single cookie have I eaten, respectively. Note that both WHQ and 
FOCNEG involve SAi in addition to FOCINIT. For the most part, there is no problem in 
saying that an expression must satisfy both the conditions of SAi and those of FOCINIT, but 
as is well known, a conflict arises when the focused proform occurs within the SU of a clause: 
FOCINIT then requires that the SU be clause-initial, ·but SAi requires that an auxiliary V 
precede the SU (perhaps via a default condition requiring that a V precede any of its 
arguments within their construct, as in the VPs of You have eate11 those cookies and I have eaten 
not a single cookie). FOCINIT wins this competition, and SAi is blocked for focused SUs: How 
many people ate cookies? and Not a single person ate a cookie, but *Did who eat the cookies? and 
•Did not a single person eat a cookie. · 
As in the morphological example from Georgian, there might be some general principle 
predicting the interaction of rules - here, predicting that FOCINIT overrides SAi when they 
are in conflict - but I have at the moment no idea of what that principle might be. The point 
at issue, of course, is the nature of the interaction, not whether the interaction is stipulated 
parochially or necessitated by universal principles. 
3.4. Optionality and obligatoriness. In the framework I have been developing in this 
paper there is no natural way to distinguish optionality from obligatoriness, either for r.ules 
as wholes or for individual formal conditions imposed by rules. I suppose we could label a 
rule as obligatory if it happened to be the only option the grammar provided for expressing 
some meaning. But in general,~ rule is an option provided by the grammar for associating 
form and meaning, and a pairing of an expression with a meaning is licensed by the grammar 
if every detail of this pairing is licensed by some rule. 
It then does not make sense to say that the English rule allowing finite clauses to serve 
as SU or DO (but not prepositional object (PO)) - That pigs can't fly distresses me and I know 
that pigs can't fly, but *I'm aware of that pigs can't fly- is somehow optional in a way that other 
rules are not. English simply has a number of rules licensing various types of constituents 
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serving as particular grels, the default rule being the one allowing NPs to serve (at least) .as 
SU, DO, IO, and PO. It also does not make sense to say that. English has a rule describing 
non-SU finite complement clauses as composed of S[+FIN] optionally preceded by the 
complementizer lexeme THAT, as in/ know (that) pigs can't fly versus 'Pigs can't fly distresses 
me. If there are different formal features, there arc different rules-. in this example, one rule 
licensing S[+FIN) as DO, and one or more licensing THAT+S[+FIN] as SU or DO. 
We might think of ultimate defaults - properties licensed by rules that override no 
others - as somehow 'obligatory', but of course they are not obligatory in the sense that the 
conditions they impose must be satisfied. NP is the ultimate default category for SUs, but that 
does not mean that all SUs must be NPs, for there are rules licensing S[+FIN], several other 
types of clause (For pigs to fly would be ridiculous, What you said impressed me), and PP (Under 
the rug is a bad place to hide a gun) as SUs. In English ACC is the ultimate default case for 
NPs; but that does not mean that all NPs must be ACC, for there a.re rules licensing at least 
three other cases (NOM in / must go, GEN in My shoulder hurts, another sort of genitive in A 
friend of mine arrived). 
3.S. Layers of defaults. Implicit in the discussion above is the possibility that syntactic 
defaults can come in layers, a possibility that is amply realized, for exa,mple in the distribution 
of cases in many languages. 
Icelandic, for example, has the (usual) ultimate default case for NPs, NOM The rule 
assigning NOM to NPs is overridden by rules associating cases with grels, ACC to DO, for 
instance.. The default DO case rule is in turn overridden. by rules for the quirky cases, as 
sketched above. In Finnish (Nevis 1981), the default DO case rule, imposing ACC, is 
overridden by quirky case rules imposing GEN in some circumstances and NOM in others, and 
these are in turn overridden by a rule imposing PART[itive] case on 'partial' DOs, those 
denoting indefinite quantities, as in the PART example SylJn puuroa 'I eat porridge' versus the 
quirky GEN example SylJn puuron 'I will eat (the) porridge'. 
4. Default associations within and beyond the grammar. At this point I must comment 
briefly about how syntax fits with morphology, with semantics, and with pragmatics, 
4.1. Syntax with morphology. There are default associations between syntax and 
morphology; the default constituency for morphological purposes is the one provided by 
syntax, which will then be overridden by conditions on morphological structure, a la Sadock 
(1985). In particular, the 'words' of morphology will be coextensive with the 'words' of syntax 
except insofar as they are stipulated otherwise, as indeed they are for bound word clitics and 
some other phenomena. 
4.2. Syntax with semantjcs. There are default associations between syntax and 
semantics, a fact that will play a considerable role in the treatment below of invocations in 
syntax: , 
4.2.1. {Sub)categories. As Schachter (1985) has argued in some detail, there are 
(universal) default meanings associated with categories like N,and V.and with subcategories 
like MASS within N and AUX within V; it is these default meanings that allow us to identify 
(sub)categories across languages. These defaults can be overric:lden by the meanings of 
particular lexemes, as when dummy N lexemes like weather IT and expletive THERE in 
Englis.h flagrantly lack the referential semantics associated with the category N. 
4.2.2. Gramcats. There are also (universal) default meanings associated with gramcats 
like PRS, PL, and DAT; it :is these default meanings that allow us to identify gramcats across 
languages - PRS as the gramcat associated with speech time; PL with numcrosit,y, DAT with 
the Recipient role via the mediation of the associations both of them have with the IO grel, 
and so on. To say that gramcats can serve as marks of syntactic constructions is to observe 
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that these default meanings can be overridden by the semantics associated with particular 
syntactic constructions, and by the listing of meanings for specific forms. For example, a 
quirky government rule assigning DAT case to DOs overrides not only the syntactic rule 
assigning ACC case to DOs but also the default association of the Recipient role with DAT. 
Similarly, a construction could impose a PRS V form, a PSP V form, a PL N form, or a 
COMP(arative] ADJ form without necessarily imposing the semantics associated with PRS, PSP, 
PL, or COMP. 
4.2.3. Triggers and targets. There are (again, universal) default associations, a la 
Keenan (1974), between semantic functor-argument relations and the constituent pairs 
participating in syntactic agreement (and government). The default is for a construct 
representing the semantic functor to serve as the syntactic target for agreement with a trigger 
construct representing its semantic argument (V heads agreeing with their SU and DO 
arguments, ADJs with their heads, and so on). And the default is for the construct 
representing the semantic functor to serve as the syntactic trigger for government of a target 
construct representing its semantic argument (V heads governing case on their SU and DO 
arguments, numerals on their heads, and so on). 
For agreement, there is also a default.association between compatibility in gramcats and 
compatibility in semantic properties, so that we expect a V agreement target to share not only 
the gramcats of its SU trigger, but also the semantic properties of this trigger. These semantic 
properties - for instance, numerosity of the SU referent, in the case of a V with a collective 
SU like COMMITTEE - are then available to condition gramcats on the target. In consequence, 
there is a potential conflict between the gramca ts imposed by agreement on the target and 
those conditioned by the semantic properties of the tarset, a conflict which can be parochially 
resolved in favor of either conditioning factor: American English The committee has decided 
(with agreement winning) versus British English The committee have decided (with target 
properties winning). 
4.2.4. Anaohors and antecedents. There are also default associations, a Ia Lapointe 
(1980, 1983), between anaphor-antecedent pairings and the sharing of gramcats, so that we 
expect an anaphor to share not only the semantic properties of its antecedent, but also its 
gramcats and even its purely morphological properties. As in the case of trigger-target 
associations, there is a potential conflict between the gramcats imposed by anaphor-antecedent 
sharing and those conditioned by the semantic properties of the anaphor - for instance, 
between anaphora to a German NEUT[er] N like MADCHEN 'girl' via the gramcat-appropriate 
(NEUT) pronoun ES 'it' or the semantics-appropriate (FEM) pronoun SIE 'she'. 
4.3. Syntax with pragmatics. There are also associations - which presumably act as 
defaults and can be overridden - between rules of grammar (in particular, of syntax and 
morphology) and a melange of conventional principles for language use that are often referred 
to under the heading of pragmatics. I prefer to talk of these principles (following a suggestion 
of Christopher Culy's) as together constituting a user's manual that accompanies the grammar 
of a language. The user's manual comes in several volumes, at least two of which concern 
what . I called 'pragmatic values' above, which (like semantic functions) can be 
default-associated with particular morphological and syntactic rules: (a) a volume dealing with 
what is conveyed, stylistically and sociolinguistically, by the options made available by the 
grammar, and (b) a volume dealing with the discourse functions of the options made available 
by the grammar and saying how the expressions made available by the grammar can be 
combined into discourses and deployed effectively within them. 
5. Invocations in syntax. As in morphology, one syntactic rule invokes, or calls up, 
others by mentioning conditions that are satisfied via those other rules. 
5.1. Mentioning immediate properties. Just as word formation rules in morphology 
invoke the rules and lists that license their inputs, so syntactic rules invoke the rules and lists 
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that license the constituent types and grels that figure in them. The English SVP rule, for 
instance, says that the combination of a SU expression and a VP expression constitutes an S. 
By mentioning these immediate properties, SVP invokes all the rules that license constituents 
(NPs, certain PPs, and certain types of clauses) as SUs and all the rules that describe VPs .. 
5.2. Mentionjng contained properties. Unlike morphological rules, syntactic rules place 
a variety of conditions on proper parts of their immediately contributory expressions. For 
instance, English has a rule that licenses head Vs (from a subcategory with members INSIST, 
REQUIRE,...) with clausal DOs whose head Vis in the BSE form(/ insist they be admitted); the 
condition on the head Y is the one at issue here. 
In a pure phrase-structure framework like GPSG, all conditions on wellformedness must 
be locally determined; branching rules are all there is. In .consequence, contained pfoperties 
must be distributed by a scheme of projection from conditions on individual branchings, in 
the same way that the ordering of individual words and the containment of a word in a 
construct of some category (say, NP) are determined by projection from the ordering of sister 
constituents and the relation of immediate constituency. The requirement of local 
determination gives rise to schemes of feature distribution • the Head Feature Convention, 
Foot Feature Principle, and Control Agreement Principle of GPSG, and their. correspondents 
in related frameworks such as HPSG (Pollard & Sag 1987) • whose function is to manage the 
appropriate projections. 
My approach here, as in Zwicky (1989c), is to step back from a discussion of formalisms 
that might allow the program of local determination to be achieved and to inventory instead 
the sorts of conditions syntactic rules can impose, without regard to. the mechanisms any 
particular theory should provide to impose them. 
5.2.1. Properties of indjvidual words or phrases. A syntactic rule can require a certain 
property on the head word-of a construct (BSE on the head V of S, in the example above); on 
an edge (first or last) word or phrase of a construct (GEN on the last word of an NP in 
English, as in my friend from Chicago's hat); on some word of a construct (WH on one or more 
words in the initial phrase in the English WHQ construction, as in Which people from which 
departments did you meet?); on some phrase of a construction (NULL on one or more XPs in 
a WHQ with initial XP, as in Which candidates did you reject NP[NULL] without interviewing 
NP[NULL]?). 
Further refinements are possible. A rule might require that exactly one (rather than 
at least one) unit have a stipulated property, and rules can differ as to just where within a 
construct they allow a stipulated contained unit to be located, as when the XP[NULL] in WHQ 
can be any number of clauses down (Which candidates did you say Jan insisted we reject 
NP[NULL] ?), while the WH word has to be in the top. level of the initial XP (People from 
which departments did you meet? but People who teach in which departments did you meet?). I 
view it as a pressing task for theoretical syntax to determine just what the full inventory of 
possible conditions on contained properties is. Here l merely suggest the character of the task, 
my immediate ai!ll being to observe that, for instance, when a rule requires as one of its 
contributory expressions an S with an XP[NULL] in it, not only are rules licensing Ss invoked, 
but so are all the rules that license XPs within Ss. 
5.2.i Property matching between expressions. Much the same is to be said for rules 
involving conditions that require particular pairs of expressions to match with respect to 
certain properties. The agreement that holds in English between SU NPs and their Vs, for 
instance, involving a matching between the person and number gramcats of the head word of 
the NP and the V, calls up all the rules that determine compatibility between heads and 
complements (or modifiers) within NPs. 
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There are at least three types of such conditions: grammatical, or local, agreement (as 
in SU-V agreement); filler-gap matching (as in the matching of properties between XP and 
XP[NULL] in WHQ); and antecedent-anaphor agreement (as in the matching between VP and 
VP[NULL] in VP ellipses: / don't have to eat the sashimi, but you must VP[NULL]). Again, it is 
a pressing task for theoretical syntax to map the world of conditions: the locations of the 
matching expressions, both with respect to one another and to other material; the properties 
that expressions must have to be eligible for matching; and the properties that have to match. 
There is a wealth of theory-specific treatments of these topics, of course - the 'binding theory' 
of GB, the Control Agreement Principle of GPSG, Jacobson's (1984) phrase-structure treatment 
of 'connectivity' in filler-gap pairings, Barlow's (1988) attempt to unify local agreement and 
anaphoric agreement in a single framework, to cite just a few important discussions - but no 
usefu_l pretheoretical characterization of the terrain. 
S.3. Explicit invocation. It could be argued that the invocations in the previous 
sections are entirely implicit in a correct statement of the rules involved. But there are others 
that appear to require explicit statement as separate conditions on constructions. These come 
in several varieties, the first echoing a type of morphological invocation, the others 
representing types of phenomena that are either rare or genuinely unparalleled in morphology. 
S.3.1. Calls on construction sets. Parallel to the morphological rules in section 1.2.2, 
there are syntactic constructions that involve generalizations across sets of other constructions. 
The English passive rule (call it #81), for instance, licenses a class of VPs (seen through 
a telescope, given two awards, slept in) by explicit reference to the full set of VPs involving 
objects of certain types. In checking that a VP is licensed by rule #81 we need to check that 
it satisfies the conditions in some other rule licensing VPs, except that it is missing some 
top-level object (DO, IO, or PO, respectively, in the examples above). 
In the same vein, modifiers of Xs are, in general, licensed by rules as optional 
constituents of constructs of category XP, that is, by reference to all the rules that describe 
XPs. ADV modifiers of Vs (like today or quickly), for instance, are licensed by a rule that 
makes explicit reference to the full set of VPs. In checking that a VP (like attract penguins 
today or bang the drum quickly) is licensed by this rule we need to check that it satisfies the 
conditions in some other rule licensing VPs, except that it has an additional ADV (so that as 
a secondary goal we must verify the VP-hood of attract penguins and bang the drum, 
respectively). 
And the primary rule that defines a VP constituent (in those languages that have one) 
involves a generalization across the rules expressing compatibility requirements on V heads 
with various sets of arguments, in that the rule says that a VP is composed of a V head and 
all of its non-SU arguments. In checking that a VP (like are penguins on my porch and was 
given two awards) is licensed by this rule we need to check that its head V and arguments 
satisfy the conditions in some compatibility rule for Vs (so that as a secondary goal for are 
penguins on my porch we must verify that BE is licensed as compatible with some class of SUs 
and two other arguments that can be instantiated as penguins and on the porch, and as a 
secondary goal for was given two awards we must verify that BE is licensed as compatible 
with some class of SUs and a passive - that is, #SI-type - VP given two awards). 
Note first that I am assuming (as in Zwicky (1989a) a partial separation of rules 
describing the compatibility between heads and their syntactic arguments (or their modifiers), 
on the one hand, from those describing the packaging of material into constituents - a 
distinction reminiscent of LFG's separation between f-structure and c-structure, but viewed 
here as a distinction between types of rules rather than types of representations. 
And note that the constructions calling on construction sets include the bulk of those 
for which GPSG has been inclined to posit metarules, but quite a different proposal is being 
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made in the GPSG framework - where metarules .predict the existence of one set.of rules on 
the basis of the existenc.e·of another set - from the view I am suggesting here, where (given 
a finite set of syntactic rules in any (variety of a) language) the applicability of one rule to 
an expression entails the applicability of other rules to that expression, 
S.3.2. Calls on specific constructions. Many syntactic constructions invoke other 
specific constructions, which .can be picked out by ad hoc names like 'FOCNEG' (for the 
English focused _negation construction) or by equally arbitrary indices like #81 (for the 
English passive VP construction). 
. . 
Examples have already appeared in other contexts. As I pointed out in section 3, for 
instance, English YNQ calls for SAi (rather than getting the default SVP), while WHQ and 
FOCNEG call for both SAi and FOCINIT. 
English has a number of compatibility rules permitting a V head, a SU, and a VP 
complement.. Some .of these place rather modest requirements on the VP. For instance, there 
is such a rule asking only that the .VP have a head V in its BSE form, as in Lynn must be 
successful; its V subcategory,comprises the modal Vs, like MUST. Others are more demanding, 
right up to the point of wanting a specific VP construction. One such compatibility rule calls 
for a passive VP, that is, for a VP satisfying the conditions of rule #81, as in Chris was given 
two awards; its V subcategory comprises only BE and GET. Another calls for a perfect VP, as 
in Pat has traveled to Spain; its V subcategory comprises only HA VE. 
S.3.3. Secondary stipulation. It is also possible for a rule to stipulate conditions at two 
layers, explicitly invoking one or more secondary conditions as well as its primary conditions. 
S.3.3.1. Secondary stjpulation of grels. Many constructions - essentially, those 
corresponding to the 'relation changing' rules of TG • involve two layers of stipulated 
conditions on the grels holding among their parts. 
For example, the English subject-to-object raising (SOR) construction (as in / believed. 
it to be raining and-/ believed there to be problems with your theory) involves.primary conditions 
requiring a V, its SU, its DO, and an infinitival VP complement to it • plus the secondary 
stipulation that the DO expression must satisfy the conditions appropriate for a SU of the VP 
complement. As these very examples illustrate, weather IT and expletive THERE can occur 
as the DO in SOR (though not as the DO in most other constructions); their acceptability 
depends on their having the properties of a SU of the VP complement: •1 believed there to have 
rained,-• I believed it to have been problems with your theory. 
Indeed, SVP itself involves a ·secondary stipulation, since.it licenses the.combination 
of a SU. with a VP having a compatible head and arguments. 
I assume that, in the default situation at any rate, these .invoked conditions can be 
predicted from the semantics, in particular the semantic functor-argument organization, of the 
construction, in a fashion similar to the default ·syntax-semantics associations sketched in 
section 4. This is my interpretation of the various ~semantic theories of control', as in Dowty 
(198S). But it seems to me that the invoked conditions must nevertheless be stated in the 
syntax, since what is required is syntactic as well as semantic congruence, as is evidenced by 
the differential behaviors of dummy IT and THERE just illustrated, 
S.3.3.2. Secondary stipulation of categories.-. Constructions can also involve two ievels 
of stipulated conditions on the categories making them up. 
SAi in English, for instance, combines a SU and not just any compatible VP, but only 
a VP with head V and complement VP (and then, of course, .not all of these, but only such a 
VP with a head"!,[ belonging to a particular subcategory, namely· AUX). It is.a characteristic 
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of 'liberation' analyses of constituent combinations ·czwicky 1986a) that they involve 
secondary stipulation of this sort. · 
5.4. Invocations by idioms. Individual idioms invoke specific constructions, in two 
rather different ways - with respect to their internal composition and with respect to external 
distribution. 
First, idioms are 'parasitic on' syntactic constructions, in the sense that each idiomatic 
expression instantiates one or more constructions in its language. The English idiom BE TO 
'visit', as in I've been to Vienna instantiates a construction with a copular head Vanda spatial 
adverbial complement, as in I've been in Vienna. And dubitative COME ON and GO ON, as in 
Aw, come on! and Go on! I don't believe it!, instantiate the· V +P construction 'in The light just 
went on and The gun went off. 
Second, idioms are subject to conditions restricting them to occurrence in particular 
syntactic constructions, even though their internal composition would not predict such 
restrictions. BE TO 'visit' is limited to the perfect construction in my variety of English: *I'll 
be to Vienna this summer, •1 was to Vienna last summer. And dubitative COME ON and GO ON 
are limited to the imperative: *He came on 'He expressed doubts about some matter'. One-word 
idioms - which is to say, individual lexemes - are well-known to be subject to such conditions, 
as when the SOR verbs RUMOR and REPORT are limited to the passive: They were rumored 
to be spies, *People rumored them to be spies. 
5.5. Layers of invocations. It should be obvious that invocations in syntax pile up in 
layers, just like invocations in morphology (section 2.4) and defaults in syntax (section 3.5). 
A sentence like Must I be kissed? instantiates SAi at layer 1, which means that at layer 2 I must 
satisfy a SU condition and must be kissed a VP condition, which means that at layer 3 the head 
V MUST has to be compatible with I as its SU and be kissed as its infinitival complement, 
which means that at layer 4 the head V BE must to compatible with I as its SU and a kissed 
as its passive VP complement, which means that at layer 5, kissed must instantiate a VP that 
has a PSP head V and is missing an object, which means that at layer 6 there must be a rule 
licensing a VP with head V KISS and a DO. 
6. The big picture. It is all very well to allude to defaults, of several different kinds, 
coming in layers, and to invocations, also of several different kinds, also coming in layers. But 
what is the scheme by which a full set of rules, standing in various relations of overriding and 
invocation, interact with one another? 
It is known th?t a program of this complexity can give rise to a number of nasty 
technical difficulties. An explicit logic of override/default relationships between rules is 
needed, and an explicit logic of invocand/invocatum relationships as well. Still, it is possible 
to discern a general interactional scheme that is implicit in my remarks in this paper. Each 
rule has both a syntactic side and a semantic side, and I will treat them separately. 
On the syntactic side, the ideal scheme is for all conditions, at whatever layer of 
invocation, to be obligatorily satisfied; that is, they must unify with one another. Default 
rules apply insofar as their conditions do not conflict with properties required by primary or 
invoked conditions. Remaining properties are free to vary. 
Consider the way SOR works in Icelandic (Andrews 1982). As in English, the rule 
requires no specific case on the DO; the default associate of the DO grel, namely ACC case, 
is then what will normally appear. Also as in English, the rule explicitly invokes a condition 
that the DO must be licensed as a SU of the infinitival VP, so that all the rules placing 
conditions on SUs and their head Vs are thereby invoked. Most of these compatibility rules 
mentioning SUs require no specific case on the SU, so that the default NOM case for the SU 
grel appears, but there are special rules (involving specific subcategories of Vs) requiring other 
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cases, for instance the DAT. When the lower Vin the SOR construction is one of the DAT-SU 
Vs, the DO will then have to appear in the DAT. · · · · · 
On the semantic side, the ideal scheme is for semantic conditions placed at the primary 
layer of the syntactic wellformedness check to be obligatorily satisfied, and for semantic 
conditions placed at any later stage in the syntactic wellformedness check (whether this 
involves invocation, defaulting, or free instantiation) to be satisfied so long as these do not 
conflict with conditions at any earlier stage. 
Thus, the semantics of an idiom overrides the semantics of its contributory 
constructions, insofar as there is a conflict, and an invocand can treat some invocatum as a 
pure formal characteristic, as when the English imperative construction is invoked in the 
primary construction of Kiss a pig and have your life changed, with the declarative conditional 
semantics of the invocand overriding the imperative semantics of the invocatum. And, as in 
sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, default semantics for (sub)categories (like N and MASS) and for 
gramcats (like PL and PSP) appears so long as this does not conflict with constructional 
semantics. 
Notes 
* This is a preliminary version (of 26 November 1988) of a paper presented at the 1989 
annual meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society. Earlier versions were presented at the 
University of Illinois, Urbana, on 10 November 1988 and at Indiana University, Bloomington, 
on 11 November 1988. My thanks .to members of these audiences - especially Clay Bond, 
Georgia Green, Erhard Hinrichs, Jerry Morgan, and Robert Port - for their comments and 
questions. 
1. The terms originate with Kiparsky (1968); see Schane & Bendixen (1978: 82) for a 
reasonably careful exposition. 
2. I make no absolute claims here about how many layers of invocation there are and 
what conditions are imposed in each layer. 
3. All references to ~case' hereafter are to morphological cases, not to any more abstract 
M~L . 
4. It is admittedly oxymoronic to.call these phenomena quirky agreement, given that 
they present themselves as disagreements in. gramcats. Quirky agreement is one of two routes 
by which gramcat mismatches (see Barlow. (1988: sec. 3.4) for a compact compendium of 
examples) can arise when matching would be expected, the other being failure of an agreement
rule to apply. · 
S. See Gazdar (1987) for some discussion of the problems default schemes. alone can 
generate. Some of these evaporate when grels are integrated within the descriptive framework, 
and others when defaults are consistently viewed as relations between rules rather than 
between properties. No doubt there is plenty of trouble left. 
References 
Anderson, Stephen R. (1986). Disjunctive ordering in_ inflectional morphology. NlUJ!lll 
Language and Linguistic Theory 4.1.1-31. 
113 
Andrews, Avery. (1982). The 'representation of case in Modern Icelandic. In Bresnan, 
427-503. 
Barlow, Michael. (1988). A situated theory of agreement. PhD dissertation; Stanford 
University. 
Bresnan, Joan W. (ed.). (1982). The mental representation of grammatical· relations. 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Bresnan, Joan W. & Ronald M Kaplan. (1982). Lexical-Functional Grammar: A formal system 
for grammatical representation. In Bresnan, 173-281. · 
Dowty, David R. (1985). On recent analyses of the semantics of control. Linguistics and 
Philosphy 8.3.1-41. 
Dowty, David R., Robert E. Wall, & Stanley Peters. (1981). Introduction to Montague 
semantics. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 
Fillmore, Charles J., Paul Kay, & Mary Catherine O'Connor. (1988). Regularity and 
idiomaticity in grammatical constructions: The case of~- Language 64.3.501-38. 
Gazdar, Gerald. (1987). Linguistic applications of default inheritance mechanisms. Jn 
Linguistic theory and computer applications (ed. by P. Whitelock, M M Wood. H. L. 
Somers, R. Johnson, & P. Bennett), 37-67. London: Academic Press. 
Gazdar, Gerald, Ewan Klein, Geoffrey Pullum, & Ivan Sag. (198:S). Generalized phrase 
structure grammar. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Haiman, John. (1980). Hua: A Papuan language of the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea. 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Jacobson, Pauline. (1984). Connectivity in phrase structure grammar. Natural Language and 
Linguistic Theory 1.4.535-81. 
Jacobson, Pauline & Geoffrey K. Pullum (eds.). (1982). On the nature of syntactic 
representation. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 
Johnson, David E. & Paul M Postal. (1980). Arc Pair Grammar. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Keenan, Edward L. (1974). The functional principle: Generalizing the notion of 'subject of'. 
Chicago Linguistic Society 10.298-309. 
Kiparsky, Paul. (1968). · Linguistic universals and linguistic change. In Universals in 
linguistic theory (ed. by Emmon Bach & Robert T. Harms), 170-202. NY: Holt, Rinehart 
& Winston. 
Lapointe, Steven G. (1980). A theory of grammatical agreement. u MA Amherst PhD 
dissertation. 
Lapointe, Steven G. (1983). A comparison of two recent theories of agreement. Chi.cll.o. 
Linguistic Society 19.2.122-34. 
McCarthy, John. (1981). A prosodic theory of nonconcatenative morphology. Linguistic
!.ruJ.J.!.ill 12.3.373-4 I8. 
114 
Nevis, Joel A. (1981). Object case marking in Finnish. MA thesis, osu. 
Perlmutter, David M (1982). Syntactic representation, syntactic levels, and the notion of 
, ,,subject. In Jacobson & Pullum, 283-340. 
Pollard, Carl & Ivan A. Sag. (1987). Information-based syntax and semantics. Volume I. 
Fundamentals. Stanford CA: CSLI. 
Postal, Paul M (1982). Some Arc Pair Grammar descriptions. In Jacobson & Pullum, 341-425. 
Sadock, Jerrold M (1985). Autolexical syntax: ktheory of noun incorporation and similar 
phenomena. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 3.4.379-439. 
Schachter, Paul. (1985). Parts-of-speech systems. In Language typology and syntactic 
description (ed. by Timothy Shopen), 1.3-61. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schane, Sanford A. & Birgittc Bendixen. (i 978). Workbook in generative phonology. 
Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Shicbcr, Stuart M (1986). An introduction to unification-based approaches to grammar. 
Stanford CA: CSLI. 
Wasow,, Thomas, Ivan A. Sag & Geoffrey Nunbcrg. (1983). Idioms: An interim report. 
Proceedings of the International Congress of Linguists 13.102-15. 
Zwicky, Arnold M (1986a). Concatenation and liberation. Chicago Linguistic Society 
22.1.65-7 4. 
Zwicky, Arnold M. (1986b). The general case: Basic form versus default form. Berkeley 
Linguistics Society 12.305-14. 
Zwicky, Arnold M (1987). Constructions in monostratal syntax. Chicago Linguistic Society 
23.1.389-40 I. 
Zwicky, Arnold M (1988). Morphological rules, operations, and operation types. ESCOL '87: 
Proceedings of the Fourth Eastern States Conference on Linguistics, 318-34. 
Zwicky, Arnold M. (1989a). Idioms and constructions. ESCOL '88: Proceedings of the Fifth 
Eastern States Conference on Linguistics, 547-558. 
Zwicky, Arnold M (1989b). Inflectional morphology as a (sub)component of grammar. 
Morohologica 1988. 
Zwicky, Arnold M (1989c). Syntactic representations and phonological shapes. Sharon 
Inkelas & Draga Zee (eds.), The phonology-syntax connection. Stanford CA: CSLI. 
Zwicky, Arnold M (To appear). Underlying representa'tion. Encyclopedic Dictionary of 
Linguistic Terminology. 
Zwicky, Arnold M. & Geoffrey K. Pullum. (1983). Phonology in syntax: The Somali Optional 
Agreement Ruic. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 1.385-402. 
